You stay classy, China:

Senior Chinese leaders taunt Tibetan leader, speak of his passing

GEOFFREY YORK

From Tuesday’s Globe and Mail

November 11, 2008 at 5:15 AM EST

BEIJING — After the near-total breakdown of talks between China and the Dalai Lama’s representatives, Beijing has made it bluntly clear that it is looking beyond the Dalai Lama to the era that will follow his death.

The 73-year-old Tibetan leader, who has suffered a bout of ill health and hospital treatment in recent months, has already given up most of his political duties. Now he faces taunting from Chinese officials, who yesterday spoke openly of his “poor health” and his “passing away.”

The Dalai Lama, hugely popular in the West and in the exiled Tibetan community, has been the nemesis of the Chinese government for decades. Beijing accused him yesterday of planning “apartheid and ethnic cleansing” in his Tibetan homeland.

In a report later, China’s state news agency said the government is looking to the “post-Dalai Lama era.” It quoted an official who made repeated references to the advanced age and “poor health condition” of the Tibetan leader.

The remarks are certain to deepen the gulf between Beijing and the Tibetan exiles, who are planning a major summit from Nov. 17 to 22 to decide on a new strategy in the aftermath of the failure of the latest talks between the two sides.

Not really much to add to this other than to say that this is just another reminder that the Chinese government is not a good faith partner in any negotiations with the Tibetan Government in Exile.

The Dalai Lama has issued a statement as preface to the special meeting to discuss the Tibetan Government in Exile’s policy towards China, autonomy, and independence in Dharamsala, India. The whole thing merits reading, but this passage in particular stood out:

In March this year, Tibetans from the whole of Tibet known as Cholka-Sum (U-Tsang, Kham and Amdo), regardless of whether they were young or old, male or female, monastic or lay-people, believers or non-believers, including students, risked their lives by courageously expressing their long-felt dissatisfaction with PRC policies in a peaceful and lawful way. At that time I was hopeful that the PRC government would find a solution based on the reality on the ground. However, on the contrary, the Chinese government has completely ignored and rejected Tibetan feelings and aspirations by brutally cracking down on them, using the accusation that they were ‘splittists’ and ‘reactionaries’ as an excuse. During those testing times, out of profound concern and a deep sense of responsibility, I exercised whatever influence I have with the international community and with China, including writing personally to President Hu Jintao. But my efforts hardly made any difference.

Since everyone was preoccupied with the issue of the Beijing Olympics, it did not seem appropriate to consult the general public at that time. Now, since the time is more appropriate, in accordance with clause 59 of the Charter for Tibetans-in-exile I have on 11th September, requested our elected leadership to convene a Special Meeting soon. It is my hope that participants will be able to gather the opinions of their respective communities and be able to present them on this occasion.

Taking into account the inspiring courage being shown by people all over Tibet this year, the current world situation, and the present intransigent stance of the government of the PRC, all the participants, as Tibetan citizens should discuss in a spirit of equality, cooperation and collective responsibility the best possible future course of action to advance the Tibetan cause. This meeting should take place in an atmosphere of openness, putting aside partisan debate. Rather, it should focus on the aspirations and views of the Tibetan people. I appeal to everyone concerned to work together to contribute as best as they can. [Emphasis added]

My friend Tenzin Choeying of SFT India is one of the Tibetan exile community’s sharpest organizers in India. He is quoted in an AFP story on the debate that is are currently underway in the Tibet movement about how it needs to respond to Chinese obstructionism.

He still commands vast respect and almost total loyalty, but many Tibetans — including the Dalai Lama himself — acknowledge that their freedom movement must learn to stand on its own.

“We have been relying on him for so long,” said Tenzin Choeying, national director of Students For a Free Tibet.

“The Chinese are just waiting for His Holiness to die because they think that will be the end of the Tibetan movement,” Choeying said.

“We must not fall prey to the same assumption … It is time for the Tibetan community to take responsibility for its future.”

China’s policy of stalling all negotiations towards progress with Tibet is premised on the belief that once the Dalai Lama passes away, so too will the cause of Tibet. They are counting on a leadership vacuum and demoralizing the Tibetan people both inside and outside of Tibet. They are counting on the world not caring once Tibet’s charismatic leader is dead. Choeying’s framing of the current situation is both the process that needs to happen to ensure that this movement doesn’t lose force and that process happening in itself. This kind of leadership is critical.

Jamyang Norbu has re-issued his important essay, “The Case for Independent Tibet.” I’d highly recommend it for anyone curious about what rangzen (Tibetan for independence) is the necessary position for resolving China’s ongoing military occupation of Tibet. This essay is especially important now as the Tibetan Government in Exile is currently holding talks with key organizations and decision-makers in Dharamsala about the future of TGIE’s policy towards China and how they will pursue resolution of the Tibet question. I and many, many people I know are hoping that the result of these talks will be the return to rangzen as the official position for the Dalai Lama and the TGIE. It’s long been clear that this is what Tibetans inside of Tibet want and Jamyang Norbu makes the case very clear.

Rebecca Novick has a long piece in the Huffington Post deconstructing Chinese propaganda in Tibet. She goes into great detail exploring one particular news report of Chinese development in Tibet. What’s remarkable is how incredulous the piece she breaks down requires readers to be. It’s like the Chinese government learned their propaganda techniques from watching late-night infomercials and 1940s war reels, and just threw in a dash of abject Han chauvinism and anti-Tibetan racism to make it uniquely Chinese. Fortunately, according to Novick, no one buys this propaganda:

So who is buying this? No one according to Tenzin Losel, a Tibetan human rights researcher with the International Campaign for Tibet. Losel was raised in Lhasa and now lives in Dharamsala, India. “Tibetans and Chinese both understand that the government report only the good things, never the bad. It’s clear that these people are coached. You can see from the way they speak they’re trying to think about what they’re supposed to say next. We see it as more like an annoyance. When they criticize the Dalai Lama on the TV, my mother would just say, ‘Change the channel'”.

Kunga Samten, a former monk, also grew up in Tibet. “No Tibetans believe it,” he says. “They know it’s all fake.” Samten is from a nomadic family and when he would watch stories like Red Flag Village on TV, especially those where Party officials visit nomad villages, he says he could easily see that it was staged. “The villagers will be in their best clothes when they’re supposed to be working. The authorities tell people what to wear, what to do, and what to say”.

Propaganda won’t make Tibetans stop yearning for freedom. It won’t make them stop celebrating their holidays.  It won’t make them stop worshipping the Dalai Lama. All propaganda will do is put the tacky veneer of control over Chinese ongoing, illegal military occupation of Tibet. And as we saw this spring, Tibetans reject Chinese rule as much today as they did fifty-eight years ago when the first Chinese troops invaded Kham and Amdo in eastern Tibet.

Xinhua:

China said here Monday that no concessions would be made on issues concerning the national sovereignty following talks between central government officials and private envoys of the Dalai Lama.

    “The unification of the motherland, territorial integrity and the national dignity are the greatest interests of the Chinese people. We will never make a concession,” Zhu Weiqun, executive vice minister of the United Front Work Department (UFWD) of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee, told reporters.

…

  Zhu admitted contacts and talks “failed to make progress”. He said the Dalai Lama side should “shoulder full responsibility for that”.

    Asked to comment on the reports in which the Dalai Lama said he would not follow a so-called “middle way” if the talks failed, Zhu said the claim of “middle way” aimed at outright Tibetan independence and thus unacceptable to the central government.

This is very bad news.  The Chinese government is refusing to ever make a concession for freedom in Tibet. The time for the Middle Path and the Dalai Lama’s pursuit for meaningful autonomy is over. Now, only full fledged advocacy for independence for Tibet will work. It’s time the Chinese government be held accountable for their persistent efforts to stifle talks and wait out the Tibet problem in the hopes that when the Dalai Lama dies, the Tibetan cause will die with him. Their cynical ploy to stymie freedom and human rights for Tibetans must be rejected, for it undercuts all claims to Chinese standing as a respected member of the global community.

Nick Kristof really has no business writing about Sino-Tibetan relations. He has limited academic knowledge, effectively zero personal connections to Tibet, and never bothers to disclose that he’s married to a Chinese American woman. But frankly, all of that is miniscule in terms of what Kristof reveals of his personal biases in a post he put up on his NY Times blog yesterday. In writing on the falling apart diplomatic situation between Beijing and the Tibetan Government in Exile following the Dalai Lama’s comments about losing faith in Beijing’s willingness to ever budge off its absolutist position on the occupation of Tibet, Kristof consistently writes from the premise that Tibetans will turn to violence. He paints in broad brushes and does so without a hint of grounding in evidence of how Tibetans inside and outside of Tibet have pursued independence over the last thirty years.

But, frankly, Kristof’s continued efforts to create Conventional Wisdom that says Tibetans will turn to violence if the Dalai Lama dies without returning to Tibet is beside the point next to the goals Kristof believes ought to be met to preclude such violence. Kristof writes:

I and others have outlined the terms — basically, the Dalai Lama accepts Beijing’s political rule over Tibet and thus grants legitimacy, and China does more to protect Tibetan culture, religion and way of life, particularly from immigration. It’s precisely the kind of agreement that Mao reached in 1951 and that Deng Xiaoping/Hu Yaobang were pushing at the beginning of the reform era, and it would leave everybody better off.

If this is Kristof’s idea of resolution, all he’s really asking for is for the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet with vague assurances that Tibetan religion, language, and culture will be protected in ways it is already protected on paper by Chinese law.  That is, take the brutal situation in Tibet today, add a splash of Dalai Lama, and Kristof thinks all will be right in the world.

Moreover, look at what Kristof sets out as an ideal: the 17 Point Agreement signed in 1951. What is a defining feature of this agreement? It was signed under duress and lacks no international standing. Here’s some history from a white paper by the Tibetan Government in Exile, which would be the definitive source on what agreements agents of the Tibetan people and government took part in.

In April 1951, the Tibetan Government sent a five-member delegation to Beijing, led by Kalon Ngapo Ngawang Jigme. The Tibetan Government authorised its delegation to put forward the Tibetan stand and listen to the Chinese position. But, contrary to the claim made in the White Paper that the delegation had “full powers,” it was expressly not given the plenipotentiary authority to conclude an agreement. In fact, it was instructed to refer all important matters to the Government.

On 29 April negotiations opened with the presentation of a draft agreement by the leader of the Chinese delegation. The Tibetan delegation rejected the Chinese proposal in toto, after which the Chinese tabled a modified draft that was equally unacceptable to the Tibetan delegation. At this point, the Chinese delegates, Li Weihan and Zhang Jin-wu, made it plain that the terms, as they now stood, were final and amounted to an ultimatum. The Tibetan delegation was addressed in harsh and insulting terms, threatened with physical violence, and members were virtually kept prisoners. No further discussion was permitted, and, contrary to Chinese claims, the Tibetan delegation was prevented from contacting its Government for instructions. It was given the onerous choice of either signing the “Agreement” on its own authority or accepting responsibility for an immediate military advance on Lhasa.

Under immense Chinese pressure the Tibetan delegation signed the “Agreement of the Central People’s Government and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet” on 23 May 1951, without being able to inform the Tibetan Government. The delegation warned the Chinese that they were signing only in their personal capacity and had no authority to bind either the Dalai Lama or the Tibetan Government to the “Agreement”.

None of this posed an obstacle to the Chinese Government to proceed with a signing ceremony and to announce to the world that an “agreement” had been concluded for the “peaceful liberation of Tibet”. Even the seals affixed to the document were forged by the Chinese Government to give it the necessary semblance of authenticity. The seventeen clauses of the “Agreement”, among other things, authorised the entry into Tibet of Chinese forces and empowered the Chinese Government to handle Tibet’s external affairs. On the other hand, it guaranteed that China would not alter the existing political system in Tibet and not interfere with the established status, function, and powers of the Dalai Lama or the Panchen Lama. The Tibetan people were to have regional autonomy, and their religious beliefs and customs were to be respected. Internal reforms in Tibet would be effected after consultation with leading Tibetans and without compulsion.

The full text of what came to be known as the “Seventeen-Point Agreement” was broadcast by Radio Beijing on 27 May 1951. This was the first time the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government heard of the devastating document. The reaction in Dromo (where the Dalai Lama was staying at that time) and Lhasa was one of shock and disbelief.

A message was immediately sent to the delegation in Beijing, reprimanding them for signing the “Agreement” without consulting the Government for instructions. The delegation was asked to send the text of the document they had signed, and wait in Beijing for further instructions. In the meantime, a telegraphic message was received from the delegation to say that the Chinese Government representative, General Zhang Jin-wu, was already on his way to Dromo, via India. It added that some of the delegation members were returning, via India, and the leader of the delegation was returning directly to Lhasa.

The Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government withheld the public repudiation of the “Agreement”. The Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa on 17 August 1951 in the hope of re-negotiating a more favourable treaty with the Chinese.

On 9 September 1951, around 3,000 Chinese troops marched into Lhasa, soon followed by some 20,000 more, from eastern Tibet and from Eastern Turkestan (Xinjiang) in the north. The PLA occupied the principal cities of Ruthok and Gartok, and then Gyangtse and Shigatse. With the occupation of all the major cities of Tibet, including Lhasa, and large concentration of troops throughout eastern and western Tibet, the military control of Tibet was virtually complete. From this position, China refused to re-open negotiations and the Dalai Lama had effectively lost the ability to either accept or reject any Tibet-China agreement. However, on the first occasion he had of expressing himself freely again, which came only on 20 June 1959, after his flight to India, the Dalai Lama formally repudiated the “Seventeen-Point Agreement”, as having been “thrust upon Tibetan Government and people by the threat of arms”.

In assessing the “17-Point Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet” and the occupation of Tibet two factors are crucial. First, the extent to which China was violating international law when the PLA marched into Tibet, and second, the effect of the signing of the “Agreement”.

The law governing treaties is based on the universally recognised principle that the foundation of conventional obligations is the free and mutual consent of contracting parties and, conversely, that freedom of consent is essential to the validity of an agreement. Treaties brought about by the threat or the use of force lack legal validity, particularly if the coercion is applied to the country and government in question rather than only on the negotiators themselves. With China occupying large portions of Tibet and openly threatening a full military advance to Lhasa unless the treaty was signed, the “agreement” was invalid ab initio, meaning that it could not even be validated by a later act of acquiescence by the Tibetan Government.

Contrary to China’s claim in its White Paper, the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government did not act voluntarily in signing the “Agreement”. In fact, Mao Zedong himself, in the Directive of Central Committee of CPC on the Policies for our Work in Tibet, issued on 6 April 1952, admitted:

(N)ot only the two Silons (i.e., prime ministers) but also the Dalai and most of his clique were reluctant to accept the Agreement and are unwilling to carry it out. … As yet we do not have a material base for fully implementing the agreement, nor do we have a base for this purpose in terms of support among the masses or in the upper stratum. [Selected Works of Mao Tsetung, Vol. 5, Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1977, p.75] [Emphasis added]

So, to back up, Kristof is putting forth an agreement signed under duress by a delegation that was not empowered to act on behalf of the Tibetan government. Discussion of the agreement was ceased following the Tibetan delegation’s objections to its content and the Chinese government, with troops poised at the border, threatened to invade Tibet and topple the Tibetan government if the delegation did not sign the agreement. The agreement itself, when signed under duress by people with no authority to approve the contents of the agreement, included provisions that allowed for the invasion of Tibet. Which is what Mao and the PLA did — invaded Tibet, conquering cities, defeating strong armed resistance across eastern Tibet in Kham and Amdo.

While the 17 Point Agreement did include some cursory protections for Tibetan religion and culture, they were never met. The only thing that came true out of the agreement made by Mao in 1951 that Kristof approvingly cites is that the PLA invaded Tibet. By citing the 1951 “agreement” Kristof reveals his lack of competence to write about Tibet. There are many histories which corroborate the narrative of diplomatic efforts laid out above. Kristof is fetishizing an illegal document that lead to a military invasion because it included the patina of language protecting religion and culture. Which, if Kristof were at least passingly familiar with the Cultural Revolution’s manifestations in Tibet, he would know never did one damned thing for protecting Tibetans under Chinese military occupation.

Nick Kristof is a joke. He has no business writing about Tibet and China. Every time he does, he reveals himself to be ignorant of modern Tibetan history, contemporary Sino-Tibetan relations, and the current desires of Tibetans inside Tibet and in exile. This is beyond embarrassing. This is the sort of punditry that leads to good people saying nothing while genocide, crime, and cultural destruction are committed. It’s time for Kristof’s editors at the New York Times get him to stop writing about Tibet.

This is incredible.

Dalai Lama says he has given up on China talks

The Dalai Lama said Saturday he has given up on efforts to convince Beijing to allow greater autonomy for Tibet under Chinese rule.

By ASHWINI BHATIA

Associated Press
DHARMSALA, India —

The Dalai Lama said Saturday he has given up on efforts to convince Beijing to allow greater autonomy for Tibet under Chinese rule.

The Tibetan spiritual leader said he would now ask the Tibetan people to decide how to take the dialogue forward.

China has repeatedly accused the Dalai Lama of leading a campaign to split Tibet from the rest of the country. The Dalai Lama has denied the allegations, saying he is only seeking greater autonomy for the Himalayan region to protect its unique Buddhist culture – a policy he calls the “middle way.”

“I have been sincerely pursuing the middle way approach in dealing with China for a long time now but there hasn’t been any positive response from the Chinese side,” he said in Tibetan at a public function Saturday in Dharmsala, the north Indian town that is home to Tibet’s government-in-exile.

“As far as I’m concerned I have given up,” he said in an unusually blunt statement.

“The issue of Tibet is not the issue of the Dalai Lama alone. It is the issue of 6 million Tibetans. I have asked the Tibetan government-in-exile, as a true democracy in exile, to decide in consultation with the Tibetan people the future course of action,” the Dalai Lama said.

His speech was translated by his spokesman, Tenzin Takhla.

The spiritual leader’s comments come ahead of a new round of talks between his envoys and Chinese government officials at the end of October. Those talks are still on track, according to Chhime R. Chhoekyapa, another spokesman for the Dalai Lama.

In my view this is a good thing. The Dalai Lama and Tibetan Government in Exile have spent over 30 years pursuing the “Middle Path” of autonomy. Not once has the Chinese government shown a desire to end the Tibet question peacefully or in line with the Middle Path.  New voices should be given strength in the TGIE – voices advocating rangzen (independence) that have been somewhat marginalized need to be given a major place in policy moving forward. Tibetans inside and outside of Tibet have never stopped striving for independence. Now is the time for HHDL and the TGIE to make those views central to their stance on Sino-Tibetan relations.

You’d think that Nick Kristof’s conversation with a friend from Beijing would give him perspective on the underlying ethnic tensions and prejudices in China and not, you know, merely an opportunity to wax poetic about the bounty to come from Obama’s election. Seriously. Kristof is the Times’ biggest Sinophile and he can’t even identify the big point when he’s writing about it.

Here’s the conversation Kristof relays in today’s column:

She: Obama? But he’s the black man, isn’t he?

Me: Yes, exactly.

She: But surely a black man couldn’t become president of the United States?

Me: It looks as if he’ll be elected.

She: But president? That’s such an important job! In America, I thought blacks were janitors and laborers.

Me: No, blacks have all kinds of jobs.

She: What do white people think about that, about getting a black president? Are they upset? Are they angry?

Me: No, of course not! If Obama is elected, it’ll be because white people voted for him.

[Long pause.]

She: Really? Unbelievable! What an amazing country!

I read this conversation as one that informs his readers about China, not the US. Substitute “non-Han Chinese” with black and “Han Chinese” with white and you’ll get some perspective on Han chauvinism in modern China. Not that Kristof notices it.